Feb 9, 2020
2020 began with a bombing in Iraq - ordered by President Trump -
which killed one of Iran's highest ranking military officers. In
this episode, we take a close look at the recent history of our
relationship with the Iranian government in order to understand how
we started the year on the brink of another war. Also, since our
President is a total wildcard, we look at what Congress authorized
for 2020 in terms of war with Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
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Bills
Bill: S.1790
- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
Congress.gov, December 20, 2019
- Sec. 1208: Eliminates the authorization for payments that
started in late 2016 “for damage, personal injury, or death that is
incident to combat operations of the armed forces in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen.
- Sec. 1210A: Allows the Defense Department to give the State
Department and USAID money for “stabilization activities” in Iraq,
Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia and authorizes an additional $100
million for this year (bringing the limit up to $450
million)
- Sec. 1217: Allows the Defense Secretary to use War on Terror
money for paying “any key cooperating nation (other than Pakistan)”
for logistical, military, or other support that nation gives to our
military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria.
- Sec. 1221: Withholds at least half of the $645 million
authorized by the
2015 NDAA for “military and other security forces of or
associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and
tribal security forces or other local security forces” for
“training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services,
stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and
sustainment” until the DoD submits a report that includes an
estimate of the funding anticipated to support the Iraqi Security
Forces through September 2025. The report also needs to include how
much and what kind of assistance if being given to forces in Iraq
by the Government of Iran. Also, a new stipulation is added saying
that our military assistance authorized since 2015 “may only be
exercised in consultation with the Government of Iraq.”
- Sec. 1222: Changes the authorization from 2015 that allowed the
Defense Department to train, equip, supply, give money to and
construct facilities for “vetted elements of the Syria opposition”
so that the “opposition” is no longer allowed to get the money or
training. The new language eliminates all mentions of the
“opposition” groups and deletes “promoting the conditions for a
negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria” from the list
of authorized purposes. The new language focuses specifically on
providing assistance to combat the Islamic State and al Qaeda. It
also limits the kinds of weapons that can be given to Syria groups
to “small arms or light weapons” (there is a way for the Defense
Secretary to waive this) and it limits the amount that can be spent
on construction projects to $4 million per project or $20 million
total.
-
Sec. 1223: Eliminates the authority for the Defense Department
to fund “operations and activities of security assistance teams in
Iraq” and removes the authority to pay for “construction and
renovation of facilities”. The law still allows $30 million for the
Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (a $15 million funding cut).
The authorization will then sunset 90 days after enactment (mid
March 2020). The OSCI can’t get more than $20 million until they
appoint a Senior Defense Official to oversee the office, develop a
staffing plan “similar to that of other security cooperation
offices in the region”, and they create a five-year “security
assistance roadmap” that enables “defense institution building and
reform.”
- Sec. 1284: “Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this
Act, may be construed to authorize the use of military force,
including the use of military force against Iran or any other
country.”
- Sec. 5322: Creates a “Foreign Malign Influence Response Center”
under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which
will “be comprised of analysts from all elements of the
intelligence community, including elements with diplomatic an law
enforcement functions” and will be the “primary organization” for
analyzing all intelligence “pertaining to foreign malign
influence.” The foreign countries that will specifically be
reported on are, in this order, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China,
and “any other country”. “Foreign malign influence” means “any
hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of
or with the substantial support of, the government of a covered
foreign country with he objective of influencing, through overt or
covert means the (A) political, military, economic or other
policies or activities of the United States Government… including
any election within the United States or (B) the public opinion
within the United States.”
- Sec. 5521: “It is the sense of Congress that, regardless of the
ultimate number of United States military personnel deployed to
Syria, it is a vital interest of the United States to prevent the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, and other Iranian backed
forces from establishing a strong and enduring presence in Syria
that can be used to project power in the region and threaten the
United States and its allies, including Israel.”A report is
required within six months that will include how Iran is militarily
training and funding the Syrian government led by President Bashar
al-Assad and the threat that Iran’s forces pose to “areas of
northeast Syria that are currently controlled by local partner
forces of the United States.” The report also must outline “how
Iran and Iranian backed forces seek to enhance the long-term
influence of such entities in Syria through non-military means such
as purchasing strategic real estate in Syria, constructing Shia
religious centers in schools, securing loyalty from Sunni tribes in
exchange for material assistance, and inducing the Assad government
to open Farsi language department at Syrian universities.” The
report must also include “How Iran is working with the Russian
Federation, Turkey, and other countries to increase the influence
of Iran in Syria.” The NDAA assumes the Iranian goals in Syria are
"protecting the Assad government, increasing the regional influence
of Iran, threatening Israel from a more proximate location,
building weapon production facilities and other military
infrastructure, and securing a land bridge to connect to run
through Iraq and Syria to the stronghold of Hezbollah in southern
Lebanon.” The report also must include descriptions of "the efforts
of Iran to transfer advanced weapons to Hisballah and to establish
a military presence in Syria has led to direct and repeated
confrontations with Israel”, "the intelligence and military support
that the United States provides to Israel to help Israel identify
and appropriately address specific threats to Israel from Iran and
Iranian-backed forces in Syria”, “The threat posed to Israel and
other allies of the United States in the middle east resulting from
the transfer of arms to… Hezbollah”, and “Iranian expenditures in
the previous calendar year on military and terrorist activities
outside the country, including the amount of such expenditures with
respect to each of Hizballah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, and
proxy forces in Iraq and Syria.”
- Sec. 6706: The
2017 Intelligence Authorization (Section 501) created a
committee made up of the Director of National Intelligence,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the
Treasury, Attorney General, Secretary of Energy, FBI Director, and
the heads of “each of the other elements of the intelligence
community” for the purposes of countering “active measures by
Russia to exert covert influence over peoples and government by
exposing falsehoods, agents of influence, corruption, human rights
abuses, terrorism, and assassinations carried out by the security
services are political elites of the Russian Federation or their
proxies.” This NDAA adds China, Iran, North Korea, “or other nation
state” to the target list.
- Sec. 6729: Orders an Intelligence Assessment into the revenue
sources of North Korea, specifically requiring inquiries into “(1)
Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore. (2) Fishing rights in North
Korea’s territorial waters (3) Trade in gold, titanium ore,
vanadium ore, copper, silver, nickel, zinc, and rare earth
minerals.” They also want to know what banking institutions are
processing North Korean financial transactions.
- Sec. 7412: Effective starting in June 2020, the President
“shall” enact sanctions on a “foreign person” if that person gives
money, material or technical support to the Government of Syria, is
a military contractor working for the Government of Syria, the
Russian government, or the Iranian government, sells items that
“significantly facilitates the maintenance or expansion of the
Government of Syria’s domestic production of natural has,
petroleum, or petroleum products”, or “directly or indirectly,
provides significant construction or engineering services to the
Government of Syria.” If the sanctions are violated, the President
“shall” use his power to “block and prohibit all transactions in
property and interests in property of the foreign person” if that
property “comes within the United States, are come within the
possession or control of United States person.” The foreign persons
will also be ineligible for visas into the United States except to
permit the United States to comply with the agreement regarding the
headquarters of the United Nations or to assist with US
law-enforcement.
- Sec. 7402: Statement of Policy: …”to support a transition to a
government in Syria that respects the rule of law, human rights,
and peaceful co-existence with its neighbors.”
- Sec. 7411: Gives the Secretary of the Treasury until late June
to determine “whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that
the Central Bank of Syria is a financial institution of primary
money laundering concern.” If it’s a yes, the Secretary of the
Treasury “shall” impose “special
measures” that could require banks to retain more records about
transactions in Syria, give the government information about the
people who conduct financial transactions with people in Syria, or
prohibit US banks from opening accounts for Syrian
banks.
- Sec. 7413: Orders the President to submit a strategy to
Congress by June 2020 to “deter foreign persons from entering into
contracts related to reconstruction” in areas of Syria under the
control of the Government of Syria, the Government of Russia, or
the Government of Iran.
- Sec. 7424: Authorizes the Secretary of State to “provide
assistance to support entities that are conducting criminal
investigations, supporting prosecutions, or collecting evidence”
against those that have committed war crimes in Syria. The
assistance can’t be given as long as President Bashar al-Assad is
in power, can’t be used to build judicial capacities of the Syrian
government, or for prosecutions in the domestic courts of
Syria.
- Sec. 7438: This title (Sections 7401-7438) sunsets in 5
years.
Bill:
H.Con.Res.83 - Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of
the War Powers Resolution to terminate the use of United States
Armed Forces to engage in hostilities in or against Iran.
Congress.gov, January 9, 2020
Bill:
H. R. 1158 - Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 GPO, January
3, 2019
- Sec. 9007: No funds from this year’s funding or any
other law can’t be used to “establish any military installation or
base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of
United States Forces in Iraq” or to “exercise United States control
over any oil resource of Iraq”
Bill: H.R.3107
- Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 Congress.gov, August 5,
1996
Articles/Documents
- Article:
More US service members diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries
following Iran strike by Barbara Starr and Zachary Choen, CNN,
January 30, 2020
- Article:
House Votes 'No War Against Iran,' In Rebuke To Trump by Merrit
Kennedy, npr, January 30, 2020
- Article:
Overnight Defense: White House threatens to veto House Iran bills |
Dems 'frustrated' after Iran briefing | Lawmakers warn US, UK intel
sharing at risk after Huawei decision by Ellen Mitchell, The
Hill, January 28, 2020
- Article:
T‘Demeaned and Humiliated’: What Happened to These Iranians at U.S.
Airports by Caleb Hampton and Caitlin Dickerson, The New York
Times, January 25, 2020
- Article:
The Iranian revolution—A timeline of events by Suzanne Maloney
and Keian Razipour, Brookings, January 24, 2020
- Document: Iran Sanctions by
Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, January 24,
2020
- Article:
KEY ARCHITECT OF 2003 IRAQ WAR IS NOW A KEY ARCHITECT OF TRUMP IRAN
POLICY by Jon Schwarz, The Intercept, January 16, 2020
- Article:
INSTEX fails to support EU-Iran trade as nuclear accord falters
by Alexandra Brzozowski, Euractiv, January 14, 2020
- Article:
The Members of Congress Who Profit From War by Donald Shaw and
David Moore, Sludge, January 13, 2020
- Article: Under
pressure, Iran admits it shot down jetliner by mistake by
Nasser Karimi and Joseph Krauss, AP, January 11, 2020
- Article:
Jet Crash in Iran Has Eerie Historical Parallel by Karen
Zraick, The New York Times, January 11, 2020
- Article:
U.S. STRIKE ON IRANIAN COMMANDER IN YEMEN THE NIGHT OF SULEIMANI’S
ASSASSINATION KILLED THE WRONG MAN by Alex Emmons, The
Intercept, January 10, 2020
- Article:
New Iran revelations suggest Trumps deceptions were deeper than we
thought by Paul Waldman and Greg Sargent, The Washington Post,
January 10, 2020
- Article:
On the day U.S. forces killed Soleimani they targeted a senior
Iranian official in Yemen by John Hudson, Missy Ryan and Josh
Dawsey, The Washington Post, January 10, 2020
- Article: Venezuela: Guaido
Installs Parallel Parliament After Washington Threatens More
Sanctions By Ricardo Vaz, Venezuelanalysis.com, January 8,
2020
- Article:
US-Iran tensions: Timeline of events leading to Soleimani
killing Aljazeera, January 8, 2020
- Article:
The Quiet Billionaires Behind America’s Predator Drone That Killed
Iran’s Soleimani by Deniz Çam and Christopher Helman, Forbes,
January 7, 2020
- Article: U.S.
contractor killed in Iraq, which led to strike on Iranian general,
buried in Sacramento by Sawsan Morrar and Sam Stanton, The
Sacramento Bee, January 7, 2020
- Article: US won’t
grant Iran foreign minister visa for UN visit by Matthew Lee,
Associated Press, January 7, 2020
- Article:
Iran's Zarif accuses U.S. of violating U.N. deal by denying him a
visa by Michelle Nichols, Reuters, January 7, 2020
- Article:
What Is the Status of the Iran Nuclear Agreement? by Zachary
Laub and Kali Robinson, Council on Foreign Relations, January 7,
2020
- Article:
For Some Never Trumpers, Killing of Suleimani Was Finally Something
to Like by Michael Crowley, The New York Times, January 6,
2020
- Article:
Who Was The Iraqi Commander Also Killed In The Baghdad Drone
Strike? by Matthew S. Schwartz, npr, January 4, 2020
- Article:
Will There Be a Draft? Young People Worry After Military Strike
by Sarah Mervosh, The New York Times, January 3, 2020
- Article:
Four Years Ago, Trump Had No Clue Who Iran’s Suleimani Was. Now He
May Have Kicked Off WWIII. by Mehdi Hasan, The Intercept,
January 3, 2020
- Article:
WITH SULEIMANI ASSASSINATION, TRUMP IS DOING THE BIDDING OF
WASHINGTON’S MOST VILE CABAL by Jeremy Scahill, The Intercept,
January 3, 2020
- Article:
America is guilty of everything we accuse Iran of doing by Ryan
Cooper, The Week, January 3, 2020
- Article:
Hashd deputy Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis: Iran's man in Baghdad
Aljazeera, January 3, 2020
- Article:
Well, that escalated quickly By Derek Davison, Foreign
Exchanges, January 2, 2020
- Article:
After Embassy Attack, U.S. Is Prepared to Pre-emptively Strike
Militias in Iraq By Thomas Gibbons-Neff, The New York Times,
January 2, 2020
- Article:
U.S. Sanctions Have Cost Iran $200 Billion RFE/RL staff,
OilPrice.com, January 2, 2020
- Article:
Protesters storm US embassy compound in Baghdad Aljazeera,
December 31, 2019
- Article: US strikes
hit Iraqi militia blamed in contractor’s death Ellen Knickmeyer
and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, AP, December 30, 2019
- Article: Saudi Arabia
oil attacks: UN 'unable to confirm Iranian involvement' BBC
News, December 11, 2019
- Article:
Six charts that show how hard US sanctions have hit Iran by
Franklin Foer, BBC News, December 9, 2019
- Article:
At War with the Truth by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post,
December 9, 2019
- Article:
Foundation for Defense of Democracies Militarist Monitor,
October 18, 2019
- Article: Gulf tanker
attacks: Iran releases photos of 'attacked' ship BBC News,
October 14, 2019
- Article:
US-Iran standoff: A timeline of key events Aljazeera, September
25, 2019
- Article:
US Offered Millions To Indian Captain Of Iran Oil Tanker Heading To
Syria NDTV, September 5, 2019
- Press Release:
Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini
following the Foreign Affairs Council by European Union
External Action, July 15, 2019
- Article:
Pentagon nominee Esper, a former Raytheon lobbyist, must extend
recusal, says Warren By Joe Gould, DefenseNews, July 15,
2019
- Article:
INSTEX: Doubts linger over Europe's Iran sanctions workaround
By Siobhan Dowling, Aljazeera, July 1, 2019
- Press Release:
Chair's statement following the 28 June 2019 meeting of the Joint
Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by
European Union External Action, June 28, 2019
- Article:
Iran executes 'defence ministry contractor' over spying for CIA
Aljazeera, June 22, 2019
- Article:
Saudi oil tankers show 'significant damage' after attack –
Riyadh By Patrick Wintour, The Guardian, May 13, 2019
- Article:
Bolton: US deploying bombers to Middle East in warning to Iran
Aljazeera, May 6, 2019
- Statement:
Statement from the National Security Advisor Ambassador John
Bolton WhiteHouse.gov, May 5, 2019
- Article:
Iran responds in kind to Trump's IRGC 'terrorist' designation
Aljazeera, April 8, 2019
- Statement:
Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization WhiteHouse.gov, April 8, 2019
- Document: The European
Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview By Pat Towell and
Aras D. Kazlauskas, Congressional Research Center, August 8,
2018
- Article:
Mike Pompeo speech: What are the 12 demands given to Iran? By
Aljazeera News, May 21, 2018
- Article: Trump Jr. and
Other Aides Met With Gulf Emissary Offering Help to Win
Election By Mark Mazzetti, Ronen Bergman and David D.
Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, May 19, 2018
- Article:
If the Iran deal had been a Senate-confirmed treaty, would Trump
have been forced to stay in? Nope. By Andrew Rudalevige , The
Washington Post, May 9, 2018
- Article:
Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned By Mark
Landler, The New York Times, May 8, 2018
- Article:
Valiant picks up another government business in $135M cash deal
By Robert J. Terry, The Washington Business Journal, April 19,
2018
- Article:
64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup By
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Foreign Policy, June 20, 2017
- Article:
CIA Creates New Mission Center to Turn Up the Heat on Iran By
Shane Harris, The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2017
- Article:
CIA establishes mission center focused on North Korea By Max
Greenwood, The Hill, May 10, 2017
- Article:
The Shadow Commander By Dexter Filkins, The New Yorker,
September 23, 2013
- Article:
Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives
By Ian Black, The Guardian, September 23, 2010
- Document:
Executive Order 12959—Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect
to Iran Administration of William J. Clinton, GPO, May 7,
1995
- Document:
Middle East Peace Process, Executive Order 12957—Prohibiting
Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of Iranian
Petroleum Resources Administration of William J. Clinton, GPO,
March 15, 1995
Additional Resources
- Biography: Reuel Marc
Gerecht Foundation for Defense of Democracies
- Budget:
EUROPEAN DETERRENCE INITIATIVE, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal
Year (FY) 2020 By Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
March 2019
- Budget:
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE, Department of Defense Budget
Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
February 2017
- Fundraising Summary:
Sen. James E Risch - Idaho OpenSecrets.org
- Joint Resolution: Public
Law 107–40 107th Congress GPO, Congress.gov, September 18,
2001
- Podcast Episode:
GHOSTS OF MOSSADEGH: THE IRAN CABLES, U.S. EMPIRE, AND THE ARC OF
HISTORY
- Document:
TITLE 31—MONEY AND FINANCE GovInfo.gov
- Video:
Why I Voted Against The Sactions Bill Bernie Sanders
- Video:
MORE THAN JUST RUSSIA — THERE’S A STRONG CASE FOR THE TRUMP TEAM
COLLUDING WITH SAUDI ARABIA, ISRAEL, AND THE UAE By Jeremy
Scahill, The Intercept
- Vote Results: ROLL CALL 33,
Merchant Mariners of World War II Congressional Medal Act Clerk
of House of Representatives
- Vote Results: ROLL CALL 34,
Merchant Mariners of World War II Congressional Medal Act Clerk
of House of Representatives
Sound Clip Sources
Watch on
Youtube
Watch on CSPAN
Witnesses
- DID NOT SHOW: Mike Pompeo
- Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign
Relations
- Avril Haines, Columbia University (formerly NSA and CIA)
- Stephen Hadley
Transcript:
44:55 Richard Haass: Here, I would
highlight the American decision in 2018 to exit the 2015 nuclear
agreement, the JCPOA, and the decision to introduce significant
sanctions against Iran. These sanctions constituted a form of
economic warfare. Iran was not in a position to respond in kind and
instead instituted a series of military actions meant to make the
United States and others pay a price for these sanctions and
therefore to conclude they needed to be removed. It is also
important, I believe, to point out here that the United States did
not provide a diplomatic alternative to Iran when it imposed these
sanctions. This was the context in which the targeted killing of
Qassem Suleimani took place. This event needs to be assessed from
two vantage points. One is legality. It would have been justified
to attack Suleimani if he was involved in mounting a military
action that was imminent. If there is evidence that can responsibly
be made public supporting that these criteria were met of
imminence, it should be. If, however, it turns out criteria were
not met, that what took place was an action of choice rather than
the necessity, I fear it will lead to an open ended conflict
between the United States and Iran. Fought in many places with many
tools and few red lines that will be observed. The President
tweeted yesterday that the question of this imminence doesn't
really matter. I would respectfully disagree. Imminence is central
to the concept of preemption, which is treated in international law
as a legitimate form of self defense. Preventive attacks though are
something very different. They are mounted against a gathering
threat rather than an imminent one, and a world of regular
preventive actions would be one in which conflict was
prevalent.
47:20 Richard Haass: First, there were
other, and I believe better ways to reestablish deterrence with
Iran. Secondly, the killing interrupted what I believe were useful
political dynamics in both Iran and Iraq. Thirdly, U.S.-Iraqi ties
were deeply strained. Fourthly, we've been forced to send more
forces to the region rather than make them available elsewhere.
Fifthly, given all worldwide challenges, I do not believe it is in
our strategic interest to have a new war in the middle East. And
six, Iran has already announced plans to take steps at odds with
the JCPOA, which will shrink the window it needs to build a nuclear
weapon if it decides to do so. And if this happens, it will present
both the United States and Israel with difficult and potentially
costly choices.
50:16 Richard Haass: Let me just make
a few recommendations and I know my time is growing short. One, the
United States should work closely with its allies and other
signatories of the JCPOA to put together the outlines of a new
agreement. Call it JCPOA 2.0 and present Iran with a new deal. It
would establish longer term or better yet open-ended limits on
Iran, nuclear and missile programs. In exchange for sanctions
relief, Congress should approve any such agreement to remove the
concern that this pack could be easily undone by any President, and
such initiatives should emerge from consultation with allies. Our
policy toward Iran has become overly unilateral and is less
effective for it.
1:02:50 Stephen Hadley: The problem
was that the strike occurred in Iraq. The fear of becoming the
central battleground in a military confrontation between the United
States and Iran is being used to justify calls for the expulsion of
us forces from Iraq. But a U.S. withdrawal would only reward
Kata'ib Hezbollah's campaign of violence, strengthen the uranium
backed militias, weaken the Iraqi government, undermine Iraqi
sovereignty, and jeopardize the fight against ISIS. A terrible
outcome for both the United States and Iraq. To keep U.S. Forces in
Iraq, Iraqi authorities will have to manage the domestic political
fallout from the strike on Suleimani. U.S. Administration and the
Congress can help by making public statements reaffirming that
America respects the sovereignty and independence of Iraq that U.S.
Forces are in Iraq to train Iraqi security forces and to help them
protect the Iraqi people from a resurgent ISIS that the United
States will coordinate with the Iraqi government on matters
involving the U.S. Troop presence, that so long as U.S. Troops and
diplomats in Iraq are not threatened, America's confrontation with
Iran will not be played out on Iraqi territory, and that the United
States supports the aspirations of the Iraqi people for a
government that can meet their needs and expectations, and is free
of corruption, sectarianism and outside influence.
1:49:30 Richard Haass: The other thing
I think you heard from all three of us is the importance of
repairing the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. I mean, think about it.
Qasem Soleimani's principle goal was to drive the United States out
of Iraq. Why in the world would we want to facilitate his success
there after his death? We ought to make sure that doesn't happen.
And Steve Hadley gave, I thought, a lot of good ideas about ways we
could signal almost to help the Iraqi government manage the Iraqi
politics. We could also look at some creative things. When I was in
the Pentagon years ago, when we were building what became Central
Command, we used to look at the idea of presence without
stationing. There's ways to have a regular force presence without
necessarily having forces be permanent. This may help the Iraqi
government manage the politics of it without a serious diminuition
of our capabilities.
1:58:20 Richard Haass: I think there's
a fundamental difference between taking out a member of a terrorist
organization and taking out an individual who is, who was an
official of a nation state, who happens to use terrorist
organizations to promote what the state sees as its agenda. I'm not
saying it's necessarily wrong, I'm saying it's a big step. We've
crossed a line here. So I think one thing this committee needs to
think about is when it looks at AUMF's, none is on the books that
allows us to do this as best I understand. So I think it's a
legitimate question for this committee to say, do we need to think
about an AUMF towards Iran that deals with this set of scenarios,
where Iran would use military force to promote its ends, and also
with the one that both Steve Hadley and I have talked about here,
about the gathering threat on the Iranian nuclear side.
2:07:50 Avril Haines: Clearly the
strike had an enormous impact on our relationship with Iraq. Iraq
has come out and indicated that they did not provide consent for
this particular strike on their territory. And it has brought the
parliament to the point where they've actually passed to vote
calling for the U.S. Forces to leave. And we've seen that the Prime
Minister has indicated that in fact, they want a delegation to talk
about leaving Iraq. And I think, as Dr. Haass noted, this is in
many respects exactly what Solemani had wanted. And as a
consequence, we're now in a position where I think it will be
likely that it is unsustainable for us to have the presence that
we've had. I hope that's not true. I hope that we can in fact, get
through this period with them and that their domestic politics
don't erupt in such a way that it makes it impossible for us to
stay.
2:42:15 Rep. Adriano Espaillat: My
question to you individually, this is a yes or no answer question,
is whether or not you feel you gathered enough information or
evidence, that from the inspectors or otherwise that you feel that
Iran complied with the provisions established by the JCPOA. Mr
Hass, do you feel that they complied? Yes or no? Richard
Haass: Based on everything I've read, the international
inspectors made the case that Iran was in compliance. Rep.
Adriano Espaillat: Ms. Haines? Avril
Haines: Yeah, same. Rep. Adriano
Espaillat: Mr. Hadley? Stephen Hadley: So
far as I know, yes.
Speakers
Transcript:
Mike Pompeo: Not only when I was CIA director
did I see the history and then what was the current activity for
the first year and a half of this administration. But when I was a
member of Congress serving on the house intelligence committee, I
saw too, Suleimani's been a bad actor for decades in the region. He
has the blood of hundreds of Americans on his hand. He's killed, or
contributed to the killing of hundreds of thousands of people in
Syria, Muslims, mostly throughout the region. This was a bad actor.
And when we came to the point where we could see that he was
plotting imminent attacks in the region to threaten Americans, a
big attack, we recommended to the President he take this action.
The president made the right decision.
Transcript:
Mike Pompeo: We had specific information on an
imminent threat, and that threat included attacks on U.S.
embassies, period. Full stop.
Reporter: What's your definition of imminent?
Mike Pompeo: This was going to happen, and
American lives were at risk, and we would have been culpably
negligent, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, that
we would've been culpably negligent had we not recommended the
President that he take this action with Qasam Suleimani. He made
the right call and America is safer as a result of that. I don't
know exactly which minute, we don't know exactly which day it would
have been executed, but it was very clear. Qasam Suleimani himself
was plotting a broad, large scale attack against American
interests, and those attacks were imminent.
Transcript:
Mike Lee: They're appearing before a coordinate
branch of government, a coordinate branch of government responsible
for their funding, for their confirmation, for any approval of any
military action they might undertake. They had to leave after 75
minutes while they're in the process of telling us that we need to
be good little boys and girls and run along and not debate this in
public. I find that absolutely insane. I think it's unacceptable.
And so I don't know what they had in mind. I went in there hoping
to get more specifics as far as the factual, legal, moral
justification for what they did. I'm still undecided on that issue
in part because we never got to the details. Every time we got
close, they'd say, well, we can't discuss that here because it's
really sensitive. We're in a skiff. We're in a secure underground
bunker where all electronic devices have to be checked at the door
and they still refuse to tell us. I find that really upsetting.
Transcript:
Mike Pompeo: We know it was imminent. This was
an intelligence based assessment that drove our decision making
process.
Witnesses
- Mark Esper - Secretary of Defense
- General Mark Milley - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Transcript:
25:20 Mark Esper: Since May of this
year, nearly 14,000 U.S. military personnel have deployed to the
region to serve as a tangible demonstration of our commitment to
our allies and our partners. These additional forces are not
intended to signal an escalation, but rather to reassure our
friends and buttress our efforts at deterrence.
25:40 Mark Esper: We are also focused
on internationalizing the response to Iran's aggression by
encouraging increased burden sharing and cooperation with allies
and partners from around the world. The International Maritime
Security Construct, which protects freedom of navigation in the
Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, and the more nascent integrated air
and missile defense effort led by Saudi Arabia are two such
examples. Through these activities, we are sending a clear message
to Iran that the international community will not tolerate its
malign activities.
Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, April 9, 2019
Watch on CSPAN
Witnesses
Transcript:
15:15 Sen. Lindsay Graham (SC): Do you
agree with me that having a stabilizing force in Northeastern Syria
will prevent Iran from coming down and taking over their oil?
Mike Pompeo: It is an important part of our
overall Middle East strategy, including our counter-Iran strategy.
Sen. Lindsay Graham (SC): So, containing Iran,
would include you having a policy in Syria that would keep them
from benefiting from our withdrawal. Mike Pompeo:
That's right. It's one piece of it. Yes. Sen. Lindsay
Graham (SC): Okay.
House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 23, 2018
Witnesses
Transcript:
18:05 Mike Pompeo: On Monday I
unveiled a new direction for the President’s Iran strategy. We will
apply unprecedented financial pressure; coordinate with our DOD
colleagues on deterrents efforts; support the Iranian people,
perhaps most importantly; and hold out the prospect for a new deal
with Iran. It simply needs to change its behavior.
Transcript:
Mike Pompeo: We will apply unprecedented
financial pressure on the Iranian regime. The sanctions are going
back in full effect and new ones are coming. These will indeed end
up being the strongest sanctions in history when we are
complete.
Mike Pompeo: As President Trump said two weeks
ago, he is ready, willing and able to negotiate a new deal. But the
deal is not the objective. Our goal is to protect the American
people.
Transcript:
John Bolton: Our goal should be regime change
in Iran.
Hearing:
IRANIAN TERROR OPERATIONS ON AMERICAN SOIL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT and the SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE of the House Homeland Security
Committee, October 26, 2011
Watch on CSPAN
Witnesses:
- Reuel Marc Gerecht: CIA Officer who became a director at the
Project for a New American Century. Also a former fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute. Supported the Afghanistan regime
change and Iraq regime change. Currently a senior fellow at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, which was founded after
9/11 and it funds “experts” who pushed Congress to fight the “war
on terror”.
Transcript:
1:30:25 Reuel Marc Gerecht: Again, I
have nothing against sanctions. I think there are lots of sanctions
the United States should tighten. I'm in favor of most of what we
might call central bank sanctions, the Iran oil free zone. There
are lots of different things you can do, but again, I just
emphasize the people who rule around Iran rose up essentially
through killing people. They have maintained a coercive system.
It's become more coercive with time, not less. They do not respond
in the same rational economic ways that we do. Iran would not look
like the country it is today if they were concerned about the
bottom line. So, I don't think that you are going to really
intimidate these people, get their attention unless you shoot
somebody. It's a pretty blunt, but I don't think you get to get
around it. I think for example, if we believe that the Guard Corps
is responsible for this operation, then you should hold Qasem
Soleimani responsible. Qasem Soleimani travels a lot. He's all over
the place. Go get him. Either try to capture him or kill him.
1:32:10 Reuel Marc Gerecht: You could
aggressively harrass many of their operations overseas. There's no
doubt about that. But you would have to have a consensus to do
that. I mean, the need is to say the White House, the CIA would
have to be on board to do that. You would have to have the approval
to do that. We all know it's Washington, D C these things are
difficult to do. So you may find out that this type of covert
action is actually much more difficult to do than going after, say
Qasem Soleimani when he travels.
Cover Art
Design by Only Child Imaginations
Music Presented in This Episode
Intro & Exit:
Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on
Music Alley by mevio)